Computer-based trading and market abuse by Payne, R. & Friederich, S.
Payne, R. & Friederich, S. (2012). Computer-based trading and market abuse. Foresight - 
Government Office for Science. 
City Research Online
Original citation: Payne, R. & Friederich, S. (2012). Computer-based trading and market abuse. 
Foresight - Government Office for Science. 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/16855/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 





Foresight, Government Office for Science 
Computer-based trading 
and market abuse 
Driver Review DR20 
 




Executive summary ..................................................................................................................................... 3 
1. What is market abuse? ......................................................................................................................... 5 
2. Regulatory and economic views of market abuse ................................................................................. 6 
2.1. Legal/regulatory definitions of market abuse .................................................................................. 6 
2.2. Economic approaches to market abuse ......................................................................................... 7 
3. What is high-frequency trading? ......................................................................................................... 11 
4. Why does HFT matter? ....................................................................................................................... 12 
4.1. The role of latency ........................................................................................................................ 16 
4.2. Who is showing the most concern in these debates? ................................................................... 18 
5. HFT and abuse 1: speed and abusive strategies ................................................................................ 19 
6. HFT and abuse 2: has HFT altered the trading environment in ways that facilitate abusive strategies?
 20 
6.1. The new order flow ....................................................................................................................... 20 
6.2. Price pressure effects and the “Predatory Trading” debates ........................................................ 22 
6.3. A poorer “market ecology”? .......................................................................................................... 23 
6.4. Automation, the reduction of the strategy space, and predictability ............................................. 24 
6.5. Has HFT rendered market abuse much harder to detect? ........................................................... 24 
6.6. Informational aspects .................................................................................................................... 25 
7. HFT and abuse 3: have confounding factors increased the perceived likelihood of abuse? .............. 25 
7.1. The great tangle: latency and confounding factors ....................................................................... 25 
7.2. Fragmentation............................................................................................................................... 26 
7.3. Informational aspects .................................................................................................................... 27 
8. Can HFT make abuse less likely? ....................................................................................................... 27 
9. How does market surveillance adapt to an HFT world? ...................................................................... 28 
10. Concluding comments ....................................................................................................................... 29 
References ................................................................................................................................................ 31 
 
Computer-based trading and market abuse 
 
2 
Computer-based trading and market abuse 
Sylvain Friederich and Richard Payne1
15 October 2012 
 
This review has been commissioned as part of the UK Government’s Foresight 
Project, The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets. The views 
expressed do not represent the policy of any Government or organisation. 
                                            
1
 School of Economics, Finance and Management, University of Bristol and Cass Business School, respectively. 
We thank three anonymous reviewers for their comments. All remaining errors are ours.  





Trading is now conducted on a scale of microseconds by some market participants. Does 
extremely reduced latency increase the likelihood of market abuse – in particular market 
manipulation? 
We argue that:  
• It seems that some classes of participants perceive abuse as more widespread in today’s 
markets, where HFTs may dominate liquidity supply. 
• This perception has in itself the potential to affect the behaviour of less-informed agents, 
particularly liquidity suppliers, thus impacting market outcomes negatively. 
• The concern that high-frequency traders use a speed advantage over other agents to 
implement new abusive strategies generates much speculation but other issues may be 
equally important. 
• In particular, the growth of HFT may have altered the trading environment in ways that 
render some forms of abuse easier to conduct than in the past. 
As a result, we suggest that: 
• Perception must be confirmed or corrected through the production of hard evidence on the 
link between HFT and abuse. 
• Significant investment is likely to be required for regulators to surmount the surveillance 
issues that HFT has created. 
HF traders offer little benefit to the financial system, but they do not do much harm. 
(Lex, Financial Times, 12 July 2011) 
The view above is, to say the least, not a typical one. Much investor and regulator suspicion 
surrounds high-frequency trading (HFT). In Europe, it has been placed near the top of the 
regulatory agenda with the release of a Consultation Paper entirely devoted to it (ESMA 
2011).2
                                            
2
 This is a striking change of emphasis. Only a few months before, HFT did not register much in the EU 
Commission’s consultation leading to the update of the main piece of legislation that regulates trading across the 
EU, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (see European Commission 2010, where HFT only receives a 
passing mention). 
 In the US, the SEC spent over 20 pages of its “Concept Release on Equity Market 
Structure” detailing its concerns (SEC 2010) and the global committee of regulators (IOSCO 
2011) just released its own report largely dedicated to HFT. 
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Chief among the concerns are the effects that HFT may have on liquidity, volatility and the 
probability of flash crashes. Additionally, a possible link between HFT and market abuse is 
frequently alluded to – for example in each of the three reports mentioned above. This link is 
the focus of the current paper. Taking market abuse to broadly comprise insider trading and 
market manipulation, we discuss three, not mutually exclusive ways in which HFT may matter 
to market abuse:  
• Low latency may have increased the incidence of market abuse because speed allows HF 
traders to take advantage of slower market participants in abusive ways.  
• It could also be that the growth of HFT has changed the trading environment in ways that 
facilitate market abuse or have increased the perceived extent of abuse. This covers 
situations different from the ‘fast versus slow agent’ confrontation above, where for example 
HF traders prey on each other and slower traders may also find it easier to conduct abuse.  
• Other market developments concomitant with the growth in HFT but not only or at all brought 
about by HFT growth may also have contributed to an increase in the perceived prevalence of 
“unfairness” or downright abuse. These are confounding factors that are part of the new 
trading environment and may be hard to disentangle from HFT empirically, even though they 
are conceptually very distinct.  
The first view implies that lower trading latency allows HF traders to run rings around other 
traders. Along the second and third views, the trading landscape has changed in ways that 
may generate more abuse or make abuse perceived as more widespread, but HFTs are no 
more likely than other traders to engage in abuse. 
We argue that even though evidence supporting the first view is currently lacking, the 
perception of a higher incidence of abuse should be dismissed, whether or not this perception 
is divorced from reality: a thread running through this report will be that the subjective estimate 
of abuse that market participants form affects their behaviour and has the potential to directly 
impact market outcomes. 
Different regulatory implications may follow. If the key concern is that HFT allows some 
participants to abuse the market in ways that are not currently unlawful, then regulatory 
definitions of what constitutes abusive practices may have to be modified and new methods to 
detect such practices will need to be developed. If HFT makes old forms of market abuse more 
widespread or socially more costly than before, then exchanges and their regulators must 
improve their ability to root out such practices. If perception is mistaken, then hard evidence 
should be produced to document the reality of abuse. 
This debate is part of a broader one on HFT and redistribution. Extant academic studies of HFT 
tend to find that it has a positive effect on average liquidity, at least based on simple measures 
like bid-ask spreads. However, very little is known about the potential redistributive effects of 
computer-driven trading: who gains and who loses? The focus of this report is whether HFT 
may have affected the scale of redistribution generated from unlawful behaviour, and whether 
practices which might previously have been considered abusive are now accepted trading 
behaviour. 
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As background to this, the suspicion that most market abuse goes unpunished is widely held. 
The UK market regulator recently declared: “Our benchmark should seek to have a market that 
participants really believe to be clean and fair,” (…) “And, as a general test, I think that if you 
were to ask the market participants, they would share my view that there is too much market 
abuse.”3 However, abusive trading behaviour is easy enough to define in very general terms 
but hard to identify. Regulations against abuse are rarely enforced because it so difficult to 
demonstrate in a court of law that the intention of a trader was to manipulate prices or to profit 
from privately held information.4
Therefore this report will be necessarily speculative in nature. We will use economic theory, 
regulatory literature and qualitative evidence obtained in interviews with slow and fast traders. 
Further empirical investigation in this area is both feasible and desirable.  
 As a result, there is scant empirical evidence on the true 
extent of abuse in financial markets, and none to our knowledge on abuse specifically 
conducted using computer-based strategies. (In turn, the difficulties involved in gathering 
evidence demonstrating a clear intent to abuse the market may also explain the propensity of 
some regulators to proceed in what seems like an evidence vacuum to academics or industry.) 
We start below with definitions of market abuse and of HFT. We then discuss how they may be 
related. 
1. What is market abuse? 
Economists and regulators identify two broad types of abusive market behaviour: insider 
trading and market manipulation. The key difference between them is that the former profits 
from price movements that are expected to happen, while the latter attempts to engineer price 
movements to profit from (equivalently, one is based on privileged information and the other 
typically is not). 
Insider dealing involves trading on information that is not publically available at the time of the 
trade but is expected to move security prices in the future. A regulatory definition of insider 
trading would typically add two requirements: 
• First, the information traded upon must be expected to move security prices in the near future. 
Corporate insiders are allowed take a long-term view of the prospects of their firm -- indeed, 
this forms the basis of many executive compensation schemes -- but are not supposed to 
trade around the release of immediately “price-sensitive” information. 
• Second and crucially to regulators, trading is based on information that was obtained at no 
cost. The distinction between an ‘insider’ and any profit-seeking investor resides in this point: 
insiders did not have to expend resources accessing and processing information but became 
privy to high quality information in the course of their normal business activities. 
                                            
3
 Hector Sants, cited by the BBC, 14 March 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/business/8566904.stm 
4
 In particular, only successful instances of abuse can usually be prosecuted. Unlucky or incompetent manipulators 
are very likely to escape scot-free. 
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Market manipulation broadly implies an ability to move prices temporarily to one’s advantage. 
Before prices return to equilibrium, the trader unwinds their position at a profit. Prices can be 
manipulated in two main ways:  
• First, through credibly appearing informed. This refers to techniques such as bluffing, which 
may be conducted using various channels (e.g. internet-based investor discussion groups).5
• Second, and mostly, through trading. This type of manipulation requires the ability to exert 
temporary price pressure, a reflection of the fact that markets are less than perfectly liquid. (In 
a fully liquid market, prices only move in response to the release of new information relevant 
to future security payoffs.) 
 
Beyond very broad definitions though, the legal and the economic approach to abuse differ 
substantially in their emphasis. We consider them in turn.  
2. Regulatory and economic views of market abuse 
2.1. Legal/regulatory definitions of market abuse 
In Europe, the 2003 EU Market Abuse Directive (MAD) specifies that: 
Market abuse may arise in circumstances where investors have been unreasonably 
disadvantaged, directly or indirectly, by others who: 
• Have used information which is not publicly available (insider dealing); 
• Have distorted the price-setting mechanism of financial instruments; 
• Have disseminated false or misleading information. 
This type of conduct can undermine the general principle that all investors must be placed 
on an equal footing. 
Translating this Directive into local law, the UK market regulator (Financial Services Authority 
or FSA) lists the “types of behaviour [that] can amount to market abuse”: 
• Insider dealing, including:  
• “Improper disclosure” of inside information to a third party and  
• “Misuse of information” that can affect the share price,  
• Manipulating “transactions” or “devices” 
                                            
5
 This concern is at the heart of the 2011 bans on short-selling on European exchanges. It was hypothesized that 
short-sellers were establishing positions in financial firms before spreading false, negative rumours about the 
financial health of those firms. If prices drop in response to the rumours then the short-sellers can close their 
positions at a profit. There is no direct evidence for this type of manipulative activity occurring.  
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• Dissemination of “false or misleading information” 
• “Distortion and misleading behaviour”, defined as “behaviour that gives a false or misleading 
impression of either the supply of, or demand for, an investment; or behaviour that otherwise 
distorts the market in an investment.” 
Legal definitions of market abuse largely reflect the view that it should be prevented because it 
is unfair to someone.6
There is not much doubt that company directors and perhaps other constituencies (e.g. large 
shareholders and fund managers) are regularly aware of information that share prices do not 
yet reflect: academic studies of legal insider trading (conducted by company directors when 




2.2. Economic approaches to market abuse 
 Under insider trading, the unfairness arises not so much because the trades of 
insiders are likely to inflict a trading loss to their counterparties, but because this information 
was ‘privileged’ i.e. received by virtue of the insider’s functions and not by the resources that 
they expended seeking it. As a result of these views, the trades of insiders are tightly regulated 
on many markets and therefore it is arguably the case that the actual prevalence of insider 
trading is largely determined not by the amount of information insiders hold but by the extent to 
which they feel able to exploit it. This is itself a function of both how strict and how tightly 
enforced local regulations are. 
Economic theory does not tend to focus on the distinctions that matter to regulators between 
short versus long term price changes or the lack of cost incurred to become informed. Neither 
do economists enter into definitions of fairness in trading outcomes that they feel are not within 
their domain – they prefer the more neutral term of ‘redistribution’. An insider is just an agent 
holding very precise information, such that interaction with them is likely to generate a trading 
loss. The focus of economists in the area of abuse is on two directly related issues: 
First, they are concerned with identifying the market-wide implications of abuse: what is the 
effect of abusive behaviour on variables such as activity, liquidity, pricing efficiency and 
volatility?  
Second, whereas regulators worry about identifying the actual victims of abuse and preventing 
further instances of it, economists are concerned with how the perceived likelihood of abuse, 
as distinct from its actual occurrence, may affect market outcomes.  
• Just like the true value of an equity share, the true extent of abuse will never be known. 
Investors can only attempt to infer it. 
• Because trading is inherently strategic, the subjective probability that various classes of 
agents, especially those supplying liquidity, attach to the incidence of abuse, will alter their 
                                            
6
 Note that the definition of fairness relevant to this context is open to debate. 
7
 See Seyhun, N. (1998), Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading, MIT Press. 
Computer-based trading and market abuse 
 
8 
behaviour. Therefore the perception of abuse is capable of reducing activity and damaging 
liquidity. It matters even if it is for a time disconnected from the reality of abuse. 
The box below illustrates this difference in emphasis between the regulatory and the economic 
approaches to market abuse, specifically on the topic of insider trading.  
Finance theory and insider trading 
Regulators and the investing public tend to oppose insider trading on grounds that those 
trading with insiders are likely to lose money. Financial economists would emphasise two 
sets of implications: 
First, insider trading may improve pricing efficiency. 
• If insiders who are privy to price-sensitive information before it is made public were 
allowed to trade on it without restriction, their trading should cause prices to reflect 
information faster and markets may perform their allocational role better, other things 
equal. This improvement in efficiency thus generates a benefit for society, although it 
comes at the expense of some traders losing out from trading with insiders. 
Second though, insider trading may damage market liquidity. In the absence of insider 
trading regulation, the increased likelihood of trading against someone better informed than 
they are would cause less informed market participants to modify their behaviour. Their 
change in behaviour would likely depend on the subjective estimate they would form of the 
probability of losing out to better-informed traders: 
• Under moderate informational asymmetries, less informed agents might avoid exposing 
their trading intentions to the market by selecting pre-trade opaque trading venues 
(OTC, dark pools). Market transparency deteriorates and so may liquidity on transparent 
venues. 
• Under more severe informational asymmetries, uninformed investors might reduce their 
participation in the equity market, causing a vicious circle of illiquidity that could become, 
in extreme circumstances, a market breakdown caused by adverse selection (where 
only informed agents are left to trade).  
• Under less extreme but plausible levels of informational asymmetries, some uninformed 
traders may exit the market leading to declines in average liquidity and perhaps also 
pricing efficiency, due to the decrease in operational efficiency. (The operational 
efficiency of a financial market, as opposed to its informational or pricing efficiency, 
refers to the level of transaction costs incurred in trading. These two concepts of 
efficiency are distinct but directly related: in a market or an asset with high trading costs, 
it may not be profitable to implement an arbitrage strategy that will correct a mispricing, 
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and the mispricing may persist.) 




This illustrates the two points made above: the economic approach to abuse is concerned 
with the impact that the perceived likelihood of informed trading by less-informed agents has 
on market-wide outcomes. Their reaction may range from concealing part of their trading 
intentions to withdrawing from the market altogether. The reasoning is illustrated here in the 
context of insider trading specifically, but it applies to any form of abuse. 
Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) take economic reasoning to its logical conclusion by arguing that 
trading behaviour should only be branded manipulative and be made illegal if it is socially 
harmful to the economy. Along this view, manipulation must demonstrate the “violator’s intent 
(…) to pursue a scheme that undermines economic efficiency both by making prices less 
accurate as signals for efficient resource allocation and by making markets less liquid for risk 
transfer.” In other words, price manipulation should only be made illegal if it at once prevents 
markets from fulfilling their role in guiding productive investment and increases the costs of 
trading financial assets.8
Regulators are also concerned with market outcomes of course.  For example, they 
differentiate between market abuse and individual abuse such as securities fraud, where a 
clearly defined and limited set of investors was abused. Front-running is a case in point.
 
9
For practical purposes, the regulatory and economic approaches are not inconsistent but they 
have very different emphasis.  
 But 
whilst they recognize that abuse undermines confidence in the market at large, regulatory 
action cannot rest on attempts to demonstrate that market-wide liquidity was degraded by 
abusive behaviour. Prosecution requires identification of one or several victims. 
We know very little about either side of the argument: how many victims market abuse really 
has and what the true market-wide effects are of the perceived likelihood of losing out to 
insiders or manipulators. To illustrate, the average number of “enforcement actions” taken 
every year by the SEC over the past ten years is 50 against insider trading and 39 against 
market manipulation.10
                                            
8
 This definition seems to leave open the possibility that insider trading could be allowed if it made prices more 
efficient. The sole focus of Kyle and Viswanathan in that paper is on manipulation though.  
 These are not large numbers for what is by a long way the largest 
equity market in the world. Data from the UK FSA are more disaggregated and not directly 
comparable but the total number of actions represents perhaps half of the above (See FSA 
Annual Report 2010-11, pp. 59-60). 
9
 In this respect, the UK regulator thus considered in the past that “The Code is aimed at preventing conduct 
amounting to market abuse and FSA’s view is that front-running customer orders is a customer abuse, not a market 
abuse. Clearly, the FSA does not condone front-running and while the Code does not restrict the use of order-flow 
information, the FSA Handbook will contain appropriate rules preventing such customer abuses. It is likely that 
these will appear in the Conduct of Business Sourcebook rather than the Market Conduct Sourcebook.” (FSA 
Feedback Statement on responses to Consultation Paper 10: Market Abuse, 1999). 
10
 These “Enforcement Actions” may themselves entail a range of actions that greatly vary in their severity and 
implications, from Federal Court actions down to SEC ‘opinions’. (Abuse may be punished in other ways: 
exchanges, as Self-Regulatory Organisations, may also take disciplinary action against abuse although they seldom 
do. Individuals may also invoke Federal and State laws if they feel they have been defrauded.) 
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These definitions illustrate the difference of emphasis between regulators and economists, and 
also how difficult it is to define what insiders or manipulators do beyond broad generalizations.  
3. What is high-frequency trading? 
To understand the ways in which HFT may increase the likelihood of abuse, we need to define 
HFT and what is new about it. The upshot of this section has similar flavour to that of the 
previous one: definitional problems abound. The US SEC (2010, p. 45) notes, “The term [HFT] 
is new and not yet clearly defined”. From the name, one would suspect that HFT must involve 
in some sense ‘fast’ order submission and revision and, because it is computer-driven, 
extensive automation of trading processes. Beyond this, HFT is also typically taken to entail 
relatively small investment positions that are held for short periods, and trading that is 
conducted in a principal (“proprietary”) capacity. But this can still mean all things to all people.11
A participant gives this definition:  
 
[HFT is] any trading that’s faster than humanly possible. Any kind of trading that a human 
can’t execute anymore, that’s what I would call high frequency trading. Then I would make 
a distinction between high frequency trading and ultra-high frequency trading. High 
frequency trading would be something you can do in software, whereas ultra-high 
frequency trading is something you can try to do in software, but you are probably better 
off doing it in hardware. (Interview with Peter Van Kleef, High Frequency Trading Review, 
Sept 2010.) 
This introduces two questions to which we come back later: should HFT be defined in terms of 
absolute or relative latency, and how significant are the speed differences within the class of 
HFT players?  
For want of an agreed definition, it is at least useful to see what HFT is not. Indeed, part of the 
reason why debates surrounding HFT seem so divisive is that most observers find it difficult to 
get a handle on what high frequency traders actually ‘do’ beyond broad definitions. The other 
side of the coin is the constant complaint of HF traders themselves that what they do is 
misunderstood and misrepresented. This is because HFT is not a clearly delineated set of 
trading strategies and, for the most part, nor can these strategies only be conducted at a high 
frequency. One HF trader puts it this way: 
HFT is not a strategy; it’s a means of execution. It’s not a trading strategy, it’s a business 
strategy. It’s how you want to go about doing business, how you want to execute your 
trades and how you want to go about making money, but it is not in and of itself a trading 
strategy. That would be like saying, “that pit trading strategy” or “that long term investing 
strategy that all those mutual funds run”. (Interview with Peter Nabicht, The High 
Frequency Trading Review, 7th July 2011) 
Perhaps adding to the regulatory unease, HFT is not a standard feature of trading system 
design that is under the direct control of regulators or even exchanges, unlike for example tick 
sizes or the degree of trading transparency. It is a market-led development. Exchanges have 
                                            
11
 For a more complete taxonomy of HF trading styles, see Friederich and Payne (2011a). 
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certainly done everything they could to accommodate it by offering faster mainframes, co-
location services, smaller tick sizes, and by designing fee structures that are attractive to the 
HFT community. But they and other electronic venues were reacting to the demands of a 
substantial part of the industry and to the implications for their own business models, they did 
not engineer HFT. Regulators themselves are unsure of how they would go about curtailing 
HFT, assuming that this was their policy goal. 
4. Why does HFT matter? 
The short answer to this question is that we don’t really know yet. Both academics and 
regulators were forced to think about HFT when it became so prevalent that it was impossible 
to ignore. The few microstructure models that explicitly address the latency issues involved in 
HFT and academics are very new and academics are lacking a consensus theoretical 
framework that would help them think more rigorously about how it might affect liquidity, 
volatility or systemic risk. In the box on the next page, we review some of the recent theoretical 
pieces which present arguments both for and against HFT in terms of efficiency and liquidity. 
One approach is to ask what is new about HFT. The roles performed by computer-driven 
traders are not new. They are broadly of three types: 
Order execution. This is the traditional function of the broker in any market. This order flow is 
generated in an agency, not proprietary, capacity and in an automated way but where the 
lowest latency is not typically paramount. This activity is largely the preserve of large “sell side” 
firms. 
HFT and latency in theory 
Several new pieces of finance theory allow for speed differentials between market 
participants and thus have the potential to speak to HFT issues. Below we review a few of 
these contributions. 
Gerig and Michayluk (2010) embed an automated market-maker in a model based on 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985). A key advantage of the automated market-maker (AMM) is that 
it is able to effectively trade in multiple securities while traditional market-makers cannot do 
so. The fact that the AMM can process information from related securities means that the 
prices it sets will, in general, be better than those from traditional sources. The model results 
in more efficient prices, lower trading costs for liquidity traders and higher volumes. Thus, in 
this framework, automated trading activity is far from ‘abusive’. Martinez and Rosu (2011) 
have a similarly positive view of HFT activity. Focussing on HFT traders who use market 
orders, rather than HFT market makers, they build a model in which HFT traders use their 
speed advantages make markets more efficient by quickly bringing information to market. 
Again, this could not be described as abusive trading.  
A more worrying conclusion is reached by Jarrow and Protter (2011). They argue that the 
combined activity of HFTs who trade independently but on correlated signals may create mis-
pricings in securities that are damaging to the welfare of non-HFT traders and increase 
volatility. The detrimental effects of HFTs are generated by their latency advantage and the 
authors argue that, where possible, regulators should attempt to eliminate latency 
differentials between traders. Cohen and Szpruch (2011) build on the work of Jarrow and 
Protter to show how HFTs may profitably front-run slower traders and how this may 
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reduce market efficiency. They go on to analyse whether a Tobin Tax might limit the effects 
of HFTs on market quality. 
Cartea and Penalva (2011) generalize the Grossman-Miller framework to include a class of 
HFTs who are non-fundamental traders and exploit a speed advantage to step in and 
intermediate trade between uninformed liquidity traders (e.g retail traders) and professional 
traders. Their key result is that the inter-position of HFTs between the liquidity and 
professional traders leads to liquidity traders executing at worse prices (as HFTs extract 
some rent from their speed advantage). 
Hoffman (2011) incorporates speed differentials into the Foucault (1999) framework where 
the key advantage of speed is the fact that, after revelation of public information, fast traders’ 
orders are less likely to be picked off than those of slow traders. Hoffman’s model predicts 
that, in certain scenarios, the advantage enjoyed by HFTs leads to non-HFTs suffering higher 
execution costs and also that total social welfare may be reduced. Thus, from this 
perspective HFT activity may be damaging even if it is not actively manipulative/abusive. 
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) study a related framework and argue that the reduced 
likelihood of HFTs being picked off around public information announcements makes them 
more likely to make markets and can thus improve welfare. However, HFT activity can 
reduce welfare in this model too if subsequent to information release, HFTs can exploit 
slower traders who are not aware of the information update. 
As the preceding summaries indicate, the effects of HFTs on market quality and their 
potential to reduce efficiency and/or liquidity are still matters of debate. Note, though, that the 
empirical evidence available so far on HFT and market quality is highly weighted in favour of 
HFT, and that most of the theoretical models reviewed above do not focus on abuse. 
Statistical arbitrage mostly involves high-frequency dealing in a principal capacity. ‘Stat arb’ 
covers a wide set of strategies conducted across a variety of assets or markets. Simple 
examples involve arbitraging price discrepancies in the same assets traded on different 
venues, stocks that have highly correlated returns (‘pairs trading’), cash assets and their 
derivatives or Exchange-Traded Funds and their component securities. Computer-driven 
traders can lay claim to conducting stat arb more efficiently than traditional human traders, 
because speed allows them to detect mispricings much more quickly, and because several 
legs of an arbitrage strategy can be executed more simultaneously in time, reducing the risk 
that traditional statistical arbitrageurs incur. This role is typically not controversial and is 
considered conducive to higher pricing efficiency. 
Market-making is essentially conducted at high frequency and as principal. There is much 
controversy surrounding this role. Many HF traders are keen to call themselves “market-
makers” but this is in many cases inappropriate because they have no formal commitment to 
stay in the market. As a result, they are regularly accused by some regulators and by the 
institutional buy-side of leaving the markets when the going gets tough. It would be more 
adequate to call this class of HFTs ‘voluntary liquidity suppliers’. They would not be expected to 
behave as traditional, ‘affirmative obligation’ market–makers and less criticism would be 
heaped on them as a result.  
 




It’s mostly the latter two roles that are considered ‘core’ HFT territory today because the lowest 
latency is considered an advantage in performing these functions. What ‘real’ HFT market-
making there is takes place in assets where exchanges have retained or reinstated formal 
market-making to ensure continuous two-sided liquidity. Market making in Exchange-Traded 
Funds in particular is dominated by HF firms, because most of these funds are thinly traded 
(beyond a handful of them that track the largest equity indices), and because market-making in 
these assets is particularly closely tied to implementation of statistical arbitrage.  
Described in this way, nothing seems very new. By many aspects, HFT seems like a 
continuation of developments that have been affecting market structures since the 1980s: 
• The gradual demise of formal market-makers in liquid stocks (whether competing as on 
London’s SEAQ or on the Nasdaq, or monopolistic, such as the Specialists on the NYSE). 
Formal market-making in active names was terminated in London in 1997.  
• The automation and computerization of trading processes (allowed by less market-making, 
more order-driven, electronic structures).  
• In 1987, automatically triggered program trades were blamed for exacerbating the market 
crash; Professional market-makers have used software to automate quote refreshing 
much before the term ‘high-frequency’ was used; In the same spirit, proprietary trading has 
been implemented using trading ‘engines’ (scripts) for over a decade. 
• The decrease in trading latency, again largely the result of point 1 above. Attempting to revise 
one’s quotes or to trade faster than other players is nothing new.  
• See, e.g. the “SOES bandits” controversy in the early 1990s where fast traders using an 
electronic execution system in small sizes inflicted trading losses on those Nasdaq market 
markets that did not update their quotes quickly enough.12• Using U.S. data from 2000, Busse and Green (2001) examined whether prices reacted to 
analyst recommendations given on television. They found that “(…) prices respond to 
reports within seconds of initial mention, with positive reports fully incorporated within one 
minute.”
 
13• Order submission very quickly followed by cancellation was described as ‘fleeting orders’ 
by Hasbrouck and Saar (2009). Using data from 1999 and 2004, they noted: “In contrast 
to the usual view [that limit order traders are patient liquidity suppliers], we find that over 
one-third of nonmarketable limit orders are cancelled within two seconds.”
 
14• Regarding flash orders, Harris and Namvar (2011) note that “the function of flash facilities 
within electronic trading systems is consistent with practices that always have been 
accepted in floor trading markets. (...) The “flash period” on the floor was typically 15 to 30 
 
                                            
12
 Harris, J. and P. Schultz (1998), “The Trading Profits of SOES Bandits”, Journal of Financial Economics.  
13
 Busse, J. and T. C. Green (2002), “Market Efficiency in Real Time”, Journal of Financial Economics. 
14
 Hasbrouck, J. and G. Saar (2009), “Technology and liquidity provision: The blurring of traditional definitions”, 
Journal of Financial Markets. 
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seconds, but the notion of seeking additional liquidity from other participants in the 
exchange is essentially the same.” 
• Small investment positions and short inventory half-lives have been used since the 1990s by 
so-called “day traders”.  
• The “SOES bandits” referred to above are an example. Using data from 1995, Harris and 
Schultz (1998) found that “Bandits usually hold a position for only a few minutes.” 
• The growth in ‘worked’ order execution and attendant decline in average trade size was 
spurred before HFT by the development of quantitative techniques in portfolio management, 
in particular formal models of dynamic market impact.15
• The increase in proprietary trading has also been a long-term trend. 
 Increased investor sensitivity to the 
impact of trading costs on portfolio performance probably played a part and so may have the 
growth in benchmarking techniques (like VWAP, TWAP and other).  
• Figure 1 shows the proportion of total trading where both sides to the trade reported 
having dealt for own book on the LSE. The graph shows a continuous increase that much 
predates the growth of HF trading. 
 
                                            
15
 A well-known reference is Almgren, R. and N. Chriss (2000), "Optimal execution of portfolio transactions", Journal 
of Risk. 
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Figure 1: The graph depicts the proportion of total trading that is classified “intra-
market” by the LSE. Intra-market activity is defined as comprising trades where both 
sides reported having dealt in a Principal capacity (for own book). The Figure shows this 
proportion for components of the three main UK stock indices (FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and 
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Clearly, the roles that HF algorithms play are not new, and the individual ‘components’ of their 
trading behaviour, such as an emphasis on speed or proprietary positions are very familiar too. 
They’ve been used before and for the same purposes, although HFTs may combine them in a 
new way and perform them with greater speed. It’s tempting to conclude that HF Trading is just 
the same as before, only faster. This is the view of themselves that HFTs like to promote – they 
are not doing anything new, just performing old functions more efficiently. 
4.1. The role of latency 
Any discussion of HFT must attempt to clarify the role of latency. There are various ways that 
latency could be defined in a trading context, such as the time elapsing between a market 
event and the decision from a computer script to enter an order or revise a quote, or between 
the same decision and the moment the message implementing the order entry or quote 
revision reaches the Exchange’s systems or as the time difference between an algorithm 
submitting an order and receiving an acknowledgement that the order has reached the market. 
The market ‘event’ could be the receipt of a piece of text containing news for a market-making 
script, or a change in the price of a related security for a stat arb script, or a change in order 
flow imbalance for an order execution algo. 
A couple of decades ago, traders who could make and implement a trading decision in a matter 
of minutes could no doubt have been labeled “High-frequency” even though the term was not 
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used. In the 1990s, academics would refer to intraday data as ‘high-frequency’,16
HFT is often thought of as in terms of a reduction in average latency. But perhaps more 
important are the ways in which the distribution of latency across market participants has been 
affected. HFT may matter to abuse as it changes the relative reaction times of various trading 
constituencies. 
 at a time 
when a few quote revisions per minute on average might have placed a stock somewhere in 
the top decile of liquidity. What constitutes ‘high’ frequency today? We are told that 250 
milliseconds is an eternity to some players. When does a quote become a ‘flash’ quote? This 
suggests that an absolute definition of latency may be of limited relevance.  
• To illustrate, consider claims by HFTs that they are able to supply liquidity better than 
traditional market–makers because they are quicker to update their quotes in response to 
news, which leaves them less vulnerable to adverse selection. This can only hold true if 
informed traders have not reduced their own trading latency by the same extent. In other 
words, it relies on an improvement in one’s latency relative to that of others. In a world where 
the quoting and trading speed of all agents increases by the same factor, the only 
conceivable improvement becomes one of informational efficiency – prices adjust to news 
more quickly. (Whether it matters to efficient resource allocation that prices adjust in a matter 
of milliseconds rather than seconds or minutes is a matter of debate.) 
This implies that a speed advantage at once gives rise to claims by HFT firms that they are 
better able to perform traditional roles and to accusations of an “uneven playing field” and 
sometimes market abuse on the part of slower agents.  
A key consideration then becomes whether this speed advantage is within the reach of enough 
participants to make the market competitive or at least contestable.17
I would say the leaders in our market clearly are the small prop trading firms because they 
drive innovation. Usually you’ll see whatever is the latest and greatest technology in the 
small trading shops first. Then it goes to bigger sell side firms, then it goes to advanced 
 What is the size of the 
barriers to entry to becoming an HFT player? Some observe that the profits of HF players are 
large but that only a handful of firms dominate order flow, which would be indicative of very 
high barriers to entry. Against that, one can note that if financial means were paramount, then 
the largest ‘bulge bracket’ investment banks that are both cash-rich and have always boasted 
of being glamorous enough to attract the best talent in the industry should dominate the field. 
Instead, many of the top HF players are firms that were only known to insiders a few years ago 
(Citadel, Optiver, Getco, Flow Traders, Susquehanna etc). This trend may be reinforced by 
recent regulation, e.g. the Volcker Rule, which has caused investment banks to scale down or 
exit proprietary trading activities that might have competed with HFT firms. An HF trader cited 
above gives the following view, consistent with HFT shops having upset the old order where 
major US investment banks ruled the roost: 
                                            
16
 See, e.g., C.A.E. Goodhart and M. O'Hara (1997), “High frequency data in financial markets: Issues and 
applications”, Journal of Empirical Finance. 
17
 A market for a particular good or service is contestable if the barriers to entering or leaving this market and the 
sunk costs involved are low. As a result, even if only a few firms dominate that market, the threat that new 
competitors might enter it at any time serves to making the incumbents behave competitively. 
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hedge funds, to normal hedge funds, and maybe a couple of years later it gets to the 
mainstream in terms of normal asset managers. So I think there’s a natural progression in 
terms of people driving the technology, usually due to small firms needing to innovate, 
finding an edge in the market and their being nimble and small, so they can implement 
new technologies much quicker. If you have legacy infrastructure that cost $50 million, 
like a big investment bank might have, throwing all that out and buying all the latest and 
greatest kit is not going to be an option. But if you’re a small firm with just 50 guys and 
some new kit that costs just a hundredth of the price, then you can easily buy that and 
implement it immediately. 
What then happens, the bigger firms see that they are losing out in terms of business and 
profitability to the smaller firms. They don’t get the trades done anymore because 
someone else is faster and better in the market. So they then do some research in terms 
of finding out who that is and what they do better, and try to catch up. Then that usually 
filters through to the customers of the investment banks, which are the major cutting-edge 
hedge funds that get the insight on what the banks are doing now. Those hedge funds try 
to replicate it and it goes to bigger hedge funds, then finally it becomes common 
knowledge, and people start talking in conferences and it gets dispersed to the general 
public and the big asset managers. So that’s the national progression I would see in 
technology. (Interview with Peter Van Kleef, High Frequency Trading Review, Sept 2010.) 
We are left with incompatible views of, on the one hand, a few superfast players sheltered by 
barriers to entry and increasing adverse selection for everybody else, against an opposed view 
of the world where outfits that are small in terms of capital or number of staff dominate the field 
and make markets more contestable not through financial firepower but their ability to attract 
and combine some of the best skills available. Note that empirical research such as Brogaard 
(2010) identifies only a small number of HF firms, but more hard evidence in this area would be 
important.  
4.2. Who is showing the most concern in these debates? 
Anecdotal evidence collected in interviews or from the financial press suggests that the 
institutional buy side is the constituency that feels the most obviously aggrieved by HF 
activities. This can be illustrated by the responses to a recent regulatory consultation (IOSCO 
2011). In the consultation document sent out, questions 9 and 10 were relevant to market 
abuse: 
Q9: Do you think existing laws and rules on market abuse and disorderly trading cover 
computer generated orders and are relevant in today’s market environment? 
Q10: Are there any strategies employed by HFT firms that raise particular concerns? If so, 
how would you recommend that regulators address them? 
Among the entities that responded to Q9, all those that responded ‘No’, thereby indicating that 
they felt inadequately protected from new forms of abuse inflicted by HF players, were bodies 
representing the buy side. Similarly, overall replies to Q10 were split, except among the 
institutions representing the buy side, where the answer was overhelmingly ‘Yes’, followed by 
description of the specific concerns. 
We now turn to the link between HFT and market abuse. Most of what follows will be about 
manipulative strategies and not insider trading. We have not seen the argument made that HF 
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trading on its own could make insider trading more prevalent. HFT could, of course, make the 
profits from exploiting a particular piece of inside information larger though. 
5. HFT and abuse 1: speed and abusive strategies 
It is almost an accepted view amongst many regulators and market commentators that a speed 
advantage has allowed some firms to conduct new forms of manipulation. Regulatory and 
academic discussions of HFT produce lists of colourful names describing alleged manipulative 
HF strategies. There is mention of ‘quote stuffing’, ‘smoking’, ‘spoofing’, ‘momentum ignition’, 
‘book layering’, etc. The interpretation of some of these terms varies across documents, 
suggesting that the meaning of this terminology is clearly not fixed. Sometimes ‘order pinging’ 
and ‘flash quotes’ are also mentioned as part of attempts to manipulate.18
Several of these tactics do not seem new and, by the same token, nor is it obvious that they 
require low latency. Those described as ‘momentum ignition’ or ‘book layering’ that attempt to 
lure traders on one side or the other of the market by artificially creating temporary order flow 
imbalances, or to exploit the predictable reaction of momentum types by exerting price 
pressure seem like the exploitation of ‘positive feedback’ traders that was modeled over 20 
years ago by DeLong et al. (1990).
 
19
An exception may be quote stuffing, though its incidence is unclear. A controversy was sparked 
in 2010 by the data firm Nanex when it claimed to have uncovered evidence of quote stuffing 
on the markets.
 There are many stories among older London traders of 
situations where a group of brokers would try to trigger price momentum in times much before 
HFT. One such story involves traders simultaneously phoning several market makers and 
hitting them with orders on one side, hoping that this caused a big revision in price and then 
reversing their trades at favourable prices. Using small orders to detect hidden liquidity (or to 
find the identity of traders in a non post-trade anonymous market) was surely done for a long 
time and just not what we now call ‘pinging’. Other strategies are just order anticipation, now 
often called “Predatory Trading” that we know well are not new (see Friederich and Payne 
2011b, who supply evidence consistent with predatory trading in pre-HFT markets). 
20
 Not everybody is convinced. Hasbrouck and Saar (2010) note that “our 
observation that there is no change in the pattern of executions during or immediately after 
many of these episodes suggests that the story behind this phenomenon may be more 
complex”. Angel (2011, p. 8) believes quote stuffing patterns to be consistent with a “race 
condition” between algorithms.21 Misra (2011) feels that these practices “definitely exist” but 
that they are “blown out of all proportions”.22
                                            
18
 U.S. Senator Charles Schumer has called for the SEC to ban flash quotes, and the European Parliament has 
denounced them as manipulative. 
 He indicates that quote stuffing should be easily 
19
 Cherian and Jarrow (1995, p. 626) note: “Strategies like stop-loss orders, portfolio insurance, technical analysis, 
etc., are examples of the positive feedback types”. 
20
 This controversy is ongoing. See <http://www.nanex.net/StrangeDays/08252011.html> or the Interview 
with Eric Scott Hunsader, “Fighting High-Frequency spam”, The High-Frequency Trading Review, 26 Oct 2011. 
21
 Interview with James J. Angel, “HFT and the Fairness of Markets”, The High-Frequency Trading Review, 19 July 
2011. 
22
 Interview with Hirander Misra, “The good and bad of HFT…”, The High-Frequency Trading Review, 9 September 
2011. 
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detected and dealt with by the trading venues themselves that should have a strong 
commercial incentive to supply orderly trading services.  
Moreover, descriptions of HF players easily taking advantage of others don’t always note how 
risky these strategies can be to those undertake them, because there are other very low 
latency players out there. Whilst regognising that quote stuffing occurs, Misra points out that it 
is a crude strategy and those who undertake it are “open to getting hit by more sophisticated 
high frequency trading firms. All of a sudden they could be sitting on a price movement and 
massive positions.” (Interview mentioned in previous footnote). That these tactics are risky 
clearly does not mean that they are not manipulative. However, quote stuffing would only 
create arbitrage profits in a world with one HF player, and this may go to limit its extent.  
On the whole, this doesn’t seem to us to provide a case to amend existing definitions of abuse 
at this stage. We are not convinced that most of these practices are very new and that, if 
documented, they would be classified unambiguously as manipulative using the definitions 
given early on in this Report. This doesn’t preclude them being more prevalent or profitable 
than they were in the past, but no firm has a monopoly on ultra-low latency.  
A separate line of reasoning says that abuse may be easier to conduct in HFT-dominated 
markets.  
6. HFT and abuse 2: has HFT altered the trading environment 
in ways that facilitate abusive strategies? 
Are old abusive strategies more prevalent, more profitable or harder to catch than before in 
today’s markets? In this section, we discuss changes in trading that may be attributable to HFT 
and be associated with a higher incidence of abuse or perception thereof, whilst not implying 
that HF traders take advantage of slower players. 
6.1. The new order flow 
HFT may have changed the time-series properties of order flow in ways that we don’t yet 
understand. A dramatic decrease in trade sizes is well documented (see Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam, 2011 for the US market or Figure 2, drawn from Friederich and Payne, 2011a, 
for the UK). This decline could be driven by changes in either or both of the liquidity demand 
and supply sizes: on the demand side, order execution algorithms are designed to minimise 
market impact by using worked, dynamic execution. On the supply side, market-marking algos 
are designed to avoid suffering losses from ‘toxic’ order flow, whether because it’s better 
informed or just based on ‘order anticipation’. This may cause a reduction of their quoted sizes.  
Figure 2: The figure shows the average trade size (GBP) on the London Stock 
Exchange’s order book for large, mid and small caps, 2006-2011. 
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(Source: Friederich and Payne, 2011a) 
The role of latency in all this is not clear but Brogaard (2010) finds that HF traders contribute 
much less depth than do non-HFT agents. 
Note that Industrial Organisation aspects may be germane to this debate and they are often 
overlooked.  ‘Pure’ HFT firms, as distinct from Hedge funds or sell-side firms that implement 
HF strategies are a new type of entity in a market structure (not microstructure) sense. The 
way they trade is an integral part of their business and financial model:  
• Because the positions they take are small and short-lived, they can set up shop with a 
comparatively modest amount of capital, without needing to raise additional capital from 
outside investors. This should create competition for the large, established sell side and 
contribute to making markets more contestable.  
• Because they are not open to outside investors they can also remain pure proprietary traders.   
• However, their limited capital is perhaps among the reasons why they are unable to supply 
vast amounts of depth.  
The shallow order flow generated by HF traders may make the work of manipulators easier. If 
HFT equals lower spreads but also lower depth or resilience, then it is possible that abuse 
becomes easier as price moves are easier to engineer. Moreover if in risky times, HFTs are 
induced to unwind positions, due to their capital constraints, this may reinforce price moves 
and further destabilize markets. 
 
Another feature of the ‘new’ order flow may be its degree of autocorrelation in direction – the 
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result of algos breaking up and ‘working’ large orders electronically. We come back to this on 
the next page. 
Finally, order flow fragmentation, which spreads liquidity across several venues, and the 
decrease in tick sizes, which decrease quoted depth, are potential aggravating factors. We 
come back to these points below. 
6.2. Price pressure effects and the “Predatory Trading” debates 
A specific example of how shallow order flow could foster opportunistic behaviour is predatory 
trading, sometimes also described as “order anticipation” or “liquidity detection”. The Trade 
News (26 August 2011) reports that “Some 25% of poll respondents [on the buy side] 
considered that predatory high-frequency trading (HFT) algorithms represent the most severe 
risk of information leakage” (although this is a distant second to “Sales trader indiscretion”). 
By “predatory trading”, we refer specifically to the strategy modeled in the work of 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005). In that sense, predation is a strategy of trading at the 
same time and with same direction as a large investor whose presence has been detected by 
their ‘footprints’ in orders and trades. Concomitant trading by the predator amplifies the price 
pressure exerted by the investor’s own trades, and the strategy is settled at a profit by the 
predator by reversing their trades when they sense that the large investor has left the market.  
Friederich and Payne (2011b) find that the shallower and the more autocorrelated in direction 
the order flow is, the more profitable predation can be because price pressure is more easily 
exerted and forthcoming order flow is more predictable. This ties in with the alleged 
characteristics of HFT-dominated order flow.  
Whether predatory behaviour represents manipulation could be open to debate: 
• In theory, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) state that “The notion of predatory trading 
partially overlaps with that of stock price manipulation” (p. 1828) but it is distinct from it 
because strictly speaking, predation cannot be conducted by the predator only, as it exploit a 
large trader’s price pressure. The model, however, does not consider the possibility that 
predation can be conducted by liquidity suppliers though quote “shading” or “fading” (Angel et 
al. 2011), which as a deliberate attempt to create a temporary price change to profit from, 
seems more akin to outright manipulation. The argument relies on concentration in liquidity 
supply, again an alleged characteristic of HFT-dominated order flow. In the related paper by 
Attari et al. 2005, the authors explicitly describe the strategy as “manipulation”. 
• Empirically, Friederich and Payne (2011b) document that predatory trading may damage 
market liquidity if the conditions giving rise to predation occur frequently (as opposed to the 
extreme situations of financial distress envisaged by Brunnermeier and Pedersen).  Thus 
predation has some of the market-wide implications of outright manipulation. 
• In regulatory terms, under the definitions given above, it may constitute manipulation (as a 
type of behaviour that “gives a false or misleading impression of either the supply of, or 
demand for, an investment” etc.).  
• The SEC showed concern by recently calling for evidence on order anticipation strategies, 
described as “any means to ascertain the existence of a large buyer (seller) that does not 
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involve violation of a duty (...) or other misconduct.” The SEC further notes that “Order 
anticipation is not a new strategy. (...) Do commenters believe that order anticipation 
significantly detracts from market quality and harms institutional investors (...)?” (SEC 
2010, pp. 54-56.) • And IOSCO (2011) similarly notes that a “(…) specific concern is whether HFT enables the 
pursuit of some apparently non-abusive practices, such as searching for hidden liquidity 
and order anticipation, that results in harm to market quality and prejudices confidence in 
markets if undertaken on a large scale.” 
The fear of predation, as distinct from its actual incidence, could be enough to affect agents’ 
willingness to expose their orders to the market and cause a deterioration of liquidity. If 
considered distortionary or manipulative behaviour along the Kyle-Viswanathan definition, we 
agree that it would be a tall order for regulators to identify predation conclusively, but perhaps 
not a taller order than most other forms of abuse. 
6.3. A poorer “market ecology”? 
Speed may have caused a reduction in the number and diversity of liquidity suppliers and their 
strategies. As a result of HFTs more or less always beating the others to the post in terms of 
order submission, other agents are reduced to consuming liquidity. Liquidity supply becomes 
dominated by a few firms with a similar agenda. Anecdotal evidence is consistent with this 
view. A broker describes HF traders as “crowding out the sell-side and the institutions in terms 
of being able to earn spreads and rebates [through liquidity supply].”23 Another participant finds 
that “There has been a loss of ‘diversity in opinion’ which is a desired characteristic for a 
market.”24 Hunsader concurs: “When everything is about speed, you lose a lot of diversity; you 
don’t have all those different players with different viewpoints using different algorithms and 
with different strategies at play. You end up killing all of them (…).”25
Exchange fee structures may play a part in this. Volume rebates and maker-taker fees 
influence the strategies of HFT players by encouraging them to attempt to earn the spread, 
perhaps elbowing out other liquidity suppliers in the process. 
 
There is a scenario where markets are increasingly dependent on a handful of the lowest 
latency firms that dominate liquidity supply by dint of sheer speed. Being able to revise orders 
faster, they leave no choice to other traders but to be liquidity consumers – they are effectively 
excluded from liquidity supply. This separates agents demanding and supplying liquidity more 
strictly than before and may make for an order book where liquidity is more fickle. Moreover, 
average HFT depth may be limited for reasons described above and these firms may step 
away from the top of the order book at the slightest hint of unusual order flow (‘toxic’ flow or 
attempted manipulation). This may give free rein to manipulators to exert price pressure much 
more easily than was the case before. 
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 Interview with Joe Gawronski, “The Changing Role of the Broker”, The High-Frequency Trading Review, 28 
September 2010. 
24
 Interview with Karim Taleb, "How High Frequency Trading is Changing the Markets", The High Frequency 
Trading Review, 10 September 2010. 
25
 Interview with Eric Scott Hunsader, “Fighting High-Frequency spam”, The High-Frequency Trading Review, 26 
Oct 2011. 
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6.4. Automation, the reduction of the strategy space, and predictability 
Another source of abuse may lie in the fact that trading processes are more automated than 
they’ve ever been. At the same time, some HFT algorithms are not terribly complex and may 
react in predictable ways to certain market conditions. Hence, although there is much variety to 
the strategies that are conducted via computer, there is predictability in the behaviour of at 
least some algo scripts that can be exploited.  
O’Hara (2010) gives an illustration that involves two market-making scripts where one games 
the other, driving prices away from equilibrium. The CEO of a firm that sells execution software 
to the buy side notes that “If you think about how execution algorithms work, some behave in 
such a formulaic way that even human traders can sit there watching a real-time price chart 
and see exactly when the algo kicks in (…). Now if a human being can see it, you can be sure 
that a machine can spot it too (…).”26
6.5. Has HFT rendered market abuse much harder to detect? 
 The focus on “execution algorithms” here may point to 
incentives issues -- there may be more incentives to develop the most efficient and aggressive 
scripts to conduct prop trading than for client execution. In its contribution to IOSCO’s 
consultation in 2011, Deutsche Boerse indicates that “Concerning the pattern “layering” we 
would like to note that this behaviour is in general not conducted by machines, but by pure 
manual trading or partially “electronically assisted” manual trading. Implemented algorithms are 
easily ignited by a layered order book as such delinquents enter non bona fide orders to 
mislead the market and in particular a specific implementation of an algorithmic trading 
strategy. The delinquents do take in general advantage of inappropriate programmed 
algorithm.”  
Increase in traffic    The daily terabytes of quotes and trades data generated by HFT may be 
overwhelming. ESMA (2011) states: “When thousands of order messages a second are flowing 
to individual trading platforms it increases the challenge of spotting potentially abusive 
behaviour. Efforts to compress data to make it more manageable through aggregation are 
likely to hide much more than they reveal and the number of false positives produced by 
systems designed to provide alerts will rise.”  
Increased demands on regulators in trading and IT sophistication   Keeping up with the 
technical aspects of trading is a challenge to all regulators. A report by the Boston Consulting 
Group recently warned that the SEC had to substantially improve its IT and trading 
sophistication to stand any chance of detecting market abuse.27
Both reasons may rationally cause a decline in investors’ confidence in the fairness of markets. 
It was perhaps an extreme case (and not one of abuse) but it took American regulators five 
months to analyse 20 minutes of data covering the Flash Crash of May 2010, and we have still 
 The report notes: “The agency 
does not have sufficient in-house expertise to investigate the inner workings of [trading] 
algorithms (…)” and recommends that “The SEC should have staff who understand how to (…) 
perform the analytics required to support investigations and assessments related to high-
frequency trading. (…) the SEC requires people who know how HF traders use technology.”  
                                            
26
 Interview with Marcus Hooper, “Can Predictive Algorithmic Switching be the Buy-Side’s Answer to High 
Frequency Trading?”, The High Frequency Trading Review, 9 May 2011 
27
 "U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Organizational Study and Reform", Boston Consulting Group report, 
March 10, 2011. 
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not come to an agreed view of what happened. This should be a worrying illustration of the 
difficulty that exists in conducting investigations involving today’s data. 
6.6. Informational aspects 
An HFT-driven decrease in pre-trade transparency may also give investors the feeling that they 
are put upon. Large investors complain about the difficulty of knowing what the current price is 
when quotes are flashed faster that the human eye can see or they continuously ‘flicker’. The 
institutional buy side in particular voices frustration with the “wall of HFT noise” which would 
leave them at the mercy of their brokers and HF liquidity suppliers, who know “where the 
market is” much better than they do.  
Different participants will not only see a different picture of total order flow, they will also 
receive it as different speeds depending on how their IT infrastructure is designed, how 
physically close they are to the exchanges or data vendors, etc. In a world where milliseconds 
matter, there is likely to be truth to the claim that different agents see a different market to a 
greater extent that was the case before. A Director of the MTF Turquoise puts it this way:  
Where a customer is, relative to the different market centres, means that their view of 
price (and more importantly, not just their view of what the current price is, but actually 
their ability to trade against those prices) is totally different to a customer located 
somewhere else. I think we have to abandon this idea that there is a universal truth for the 
best currently available price. In some ways the consolidated quote in the United States is 
actually no longer real. The reason no professional market participant uses it for trading 
and submission of orders is because it’s wrong whoever you are. (Interview with Natan 
Tiefenbrun, The High Frequency Trading Review, 3 December 2010.) 
Whilst an increase in the difference of the perception of the market across agents may be 
disturbing to some, it is nothing new and it can’t represent abuse. Traders closer to the real 
prices (either physically or temporally) have always attempted to take advantage of those 
further away, and the speed of accessing and trading on market data was always a function of 
the investments that a firm has undertaken in that respect. 
7. HFT and abuse 3: have confounding factors increased the 
perceived likelihood of abuse? 
We now discuss changes in the trading environment that may have affected the perception of 
abuse in today’s markets while being less clearly or not at all attributable to HFT growth. 
7.1. The great tangle: latency and confounding factors 
A previous section outlined the fact that discussions of HFT should attempt to isolate the role of 
low latency from that of deep preceding trends such as the end of formal market-making 
commitments, the automation of trading processes and the growth in proprietary trading  (even 
though it may have accelerated some of these trends). To continue on a related thread, it is 
also the case that some developments that were contemporaneous to the growth in HFT may 
make the effect of latency as such hard to identify.  
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7.2. Fragmentation  
Fragmentation of order flow deserves special mention in this respect. That is, many venues 
and modes of trades are now available to traders, especially institutional ones. Figure 3 below 
shows the recent growth in order flow fragmentation for the London equity market: 
LSE, CHI-X, BATS AND TURQUOISE MARKET SHARES BY VALUE TRADED,  
FTSE 100 STOCKS, 2007-APRIL 2011 
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 (Source: Friederich and Payne, 2011a) 
 
Therefore the increase in fragmentation was to a fair extent contemporaneous with the growth 
of HFT, although fragmentation started later (round early 2008) and seems to have stabilized in 
late 2009, whereas the estimates of HFT we have indicate continuous growth over the period 
2007-2010.  
Compare the current trading landscape to that of a few years ago: the London Stock Exchange 
had a near monopoly on UK stock trading, and the top ten (human) brokers would intermediate 
perhaps 80% of all order flow on the order book at much slower speed. Today’s trading 
environment is more complex in every way: a larger number of participants intervene on a 
dozen venues instead of one, all this at speeds that make these activities seem simultaneous 
in time to humans but not at all to agents that operate in milliseconds.  
 




The difficulty to understand today’s trading structure may add to the frustration and the sense 
of alienation from the trading process felt by some investors. Fragmentation of order flow within 
and across borders is distinct from HF trading but it certainly makes the job of regulators harder 
and may encourage unscrupulous traders. 
7.3. Informational aspects 
First, order flow fragmentation generates fragmentation in an informational sense in European 
markets, as there is no consolidated tape displaying prices across all trading venues as in the 
US. Different market participants must decide from which vendor they will purchase their order 
flow feed and how it is going to be displayed by choosing a software front end.  It required 
significant investment and is another source of frustration for participants on the buy side below 
the largest funds, who find it ever harder to assess the quality of execution they receive from 
their broker pre and post trade. It may add to the sense of “uneven playing field”.  
A sense of reduced pre-trade transparency may also be attributable to the growth in new types 
of orders (hidden or ‘iceberg’) specifically designed to hide a substantial part of one’s trading 
interest, and the availability of ‘Dark’ venues, also designed to avoid revealing one’s intentions, 
was largely concomitant with the growth in HFT.  
These developments may have been accelerated by HFT but they are clearly distinct from it 
and they have preceded it to a fair extent. 
Reduction in tick sizes: this is another development that’s tied to HFT growth but is distinct 
from it. Smaller tick sizes influence order submission behaviour and are generally considered 
to have a negative impact on quoted depth. Lower average depth is often attributed to HF 
strategies but may also be due to reduced tick sizes.  
Discussing alleged momentum-based manipulation, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX 
2010) recognises that it may be less to do with HFT than fragmentation by cautiously stating: 
“(…) some so-called ‘momentum’ algorithms have the potential to distort price discovery for a 
security. Within a multi-market operator environment, where liquidity has been fragmented and 
where maker-taker pricing encourages algorithms to ‘chase’ one another to receive incentives, 
the risk of price distortion increases significantly.”28
8. Can HFT make abuse less likely? 
  
This view doesn’t seem to be often entertained. Yet the case can be made that at least some 
HFT activity has the potential to make manipulation attempts more risky and costly, and 
therefore to reduce their incidence.  
As described above, a sizeable subset of HF traders are statistical arbitrageurs whose focus is 
the relative pricing of economically similar securities. As such they should trade so as to 
contribute to keeping the prices of these similar assets in equilibrium and thus provide a 
counter-balancing force to those attempting to manipulate. The manipulator, for example, may 
                                            
28
 Australian Stock Exchange, “Review of Algorithmic Trading and Market Access Arrangements”, 8 February 2010. 
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try to move a stock price downwards through a burst of aggressive selling. A stat-arb algorithm 
would immediately spot that this stock’s price has moved out of line compared to its peers’ 
prices, and would quickly buy the manipulated stock (while selling some of the peer group). 
This dampens the price move and makes it harder for the manipulator to trade at a profit. If the 
manipulator was able to affect the prices of the entire set of stocks simultaneously then the 
stat-arb model could not correct the mis-pricing, but this would require the commitment of 
significant capital and a sophisticated manipulative algorithm. 
Thus, HFT algorithms of the stat-arb and market-making types are likely to limit the scope for 
manipulation. It is not clear which dominates, on average, between the forces of equilibrium 
and manipulation. 
9. How does market surveillance adapt to an HFT world? 
Aitken notes that in terms of sophistication and therefore ability to conduct illegitimate trading, 
“Regulators are behind exchanges and exchanges are behind brokers.”29
• At the individual firm level, software is developed that assesses the toxicity of order flow on 
each venue by examining patterns in recent activity. A green light is given when it’s safe.
 Market surveillance 
is gradually adapting to changes in trading practices though, whether they are HFT-driven or 
not. 
30
• At the level of trading venues and brokers, there is increased reliance on other traders to 
report potential abuse and on trading venues to police it. Some years ago, the historical 
exchanges held a near monopoly on trading in their shares and could perhaps afford to be 
more complacent. Today, the operators of electronic trading venues have stronger incentives 
to deal with simple forms of abuse because they are competing to attract order flow and must 
be seen to maintain an orderly trading system. Other traders should have equally strong 
incentives to report wrongdoers to the venues.  
 
• At the level of national regulators, recent steps taken also rely on traders. In Europe, this is 
formalised in the “Suspicious Transactions Reports” (STRs) stemming from the Market Abuse 
Directive and implemented in the UK since 2005.  
• Across markets: surveillance across venues is made crucial by the extent of fragmentation 
and the fact that abuse can be conducted across borders, classes of assets. This is one of 
the thorniest issues facing regulators. 
The broad trends are therefore to place more emphasis on market participants themselves 
(‘micro-surveillance’), to improve regulator ability to track traders across markets through the 
use of unique trader identifiers, and to try and implement a degree of real-time surveillance to 
weed out abuse as early as possible. The data overload problem noted above is here to stay 
though. ASX (2010) reports that “Several market supervisors indicated that the split between 
real time and post trade analysis is roughly 5%:95%. This strong emphasis on post-trade 




 See, e.g., “Manipulative trading detection systems spring up”, Wall Street Letter, April 18, 2011. 
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surveillance activity is necessary due to the large volumes of data that need to be integrated 
before sophisticated pattern analysis software can scan the data for indications of misconduct.” 
In May 2011, US Senator Charles Schumer has suggested that HF traders shoulder the extra 
cost of market surveillance that their activities generate, although this idea may not be easy to 
implement.  
An ongoing discussion involves the existence of a socially wasteful level of investment 
associated to HFT (the “arms race” argument). Increased market surveillance cost inflicted on 
society could even more directly result from HFT.  
10. Concluding comments 
Like many reports focussing on HFT, the current one contributes at this stage many more 
questions than answers.  
We have attempted to draw attention to two points: first, anecdotal evidence from the financial 
press, discussion with traders, or reactions to regulatory calls for evidence suggests to us that 
the perception of abuse or “unfairness” may have increased in HFT-driven markets. The extent 
to which this perception is at variance with current reality is unclear for lack of evidence on the 
extent of abuse. 
Second, we suggest that this shift in perceptions (and perhaps reality) could have occurred for 
three sets of reasons:  
• HF traders may be able to exploit a latency advantage to inflict losses on slower players. It is 
unclear to what extent these strategies are sustainable to those who implement them unless 
they hold a speed advantage over nearly everybody else.  
• The arrival of HFT may have altered the trading environment in ways that have increased 
abuse or its perception: thinner and more correlated order flow, increased opacity, use of 
more generic strategies prone to manipulation, concentration in liquidity supply. Strategies 
that benefit from the creation of price pressure effects or from the predictability of algo 
behaviour may be more tempting to conduct than they used to be. They may also be harder 
to catch: the technical and data aspects of the new trading environment make market 
monitoring harder.  
• Concomitant changes that were only partly or not at all driven by HFT may have increased 
the perception of abuse: fragmentation in an order flow or informational sense and reduced 
pre-trade transparency are examples.  
To use an analogy, HF trading is described as a mode of trade that relies on very small 
average profits that become significant when accumulated over a very large number of trades. 
Manipulative practices may have followed suit: the possibility that ‘micro-manipulation’ relying 
on the high-frequency generation of small, temporary price deviations may be more 
commonplace than before ought to be entertained. 
A countervailing force is that HFT arbitrageurs have powerful means and incentives to keep 
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prices in equilibrium. This argument is often disregarded. 
 
 
Beyond a handful of publicized cases that were prosecuted by regulators, there is no evidence 
on the reality of abuse in HFT-dominated markets. Industry voices on all sides are calling for 
more to be produced. “If the regulator has concerns over possible breaches of the market 
abuse regime in Europe as it currently stands, research into this area should be initiated. 
Although time consuming and costly, it may help to put to rest wider concerns if conducted 
effectively.” (AFME 2011) 
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